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Abstract: This paper analyses the factors that influence access to agricultural input 
subsidies in Malawi. The results show that vulnerable households such as the poor and 
elderly-headed are less likely than other households to receive fertilizer coupons and 
receive less of the subsidized fertilizers. Households with larger parcels of land and 
those who sell part of their produce (commercialized) are more likely to receive 
coupons and also tend to acquire more fertilizers. Use of open meetings in the 
allocation of coupons tends to favour the poor and the poor receive more fertilizer 
compared with discrete of coupons. We also find a positive relation between 
participation in other social safety nets and access to subsidized fertilizer coupons, 
suggesting that households that participated in other social safety net programmes are 
not excluded from the input subsidy programme by virtue of benefiting from other 
social assistance programmes. 
 
1.0 Introduction  
 
In order to address some of the problems in agriculture and to raise the incomes of the 
resource poor, the Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) was first implemented in the 
2005/06 agricultural season following a poor-harvest season and a high maize import 
bill to augment domestic supply in 2004/05 agricultural season. In 2008/09, the FISP 
was in its fourth year of implementation, with a number of changes in the scale, scope 
and ways of implementation to improve targeting and its effectiveness in assisting more 
vulnerable members of society. The FISP is largely financed by the government, with 
donor support being in form of overall budgetary support. The FISP is designed as a 
targeted input subsidy programme, targeting smallholder farmers with land but who 
cannot afford to purchase inputs at market rates. The size of the FISP has increased from 
132,000 tonnes in 2005/06 to 216,000 tonnes in 2007/08 and in 2008/9 was estimated to 
directly benefit 67 percent of Malawi’s farm households. This paper summarizes 
targeting issues and factors that determine households’ access to subsidized fertilizer 
coupons in the FISP.  
 
2.0 Coupon Allocation and Targeting in the Malawi Farm Input Subsidy1 
 
The agricultural input subsidy programme aims at promoting access and use of fertilizers 
among smallholder farmers in order to increase agricultural productivity and food 
security. According to GOM (2008b) the main objective of the agricultural input subsidy 
programme is to achieve household food self-sufficiency and increased income through 
increased food and cash crop production. In order to achieve these objectives, the target 
groups are defined as resource-poor Malawians who owns a piece of land, resident in the 
village with special consideration to guardians looking after physically challenged 
persons and vulnerable groups such as child headed, female-headed or orphan headed  
                                                     
∗ This paper is one of the outputs of the Evaluation of the Farm Input Subsidy Programme in Malawi 
2010/11. 
1 This section draws on Dorward and Chirwa (2009) and Dorward et al. (2010). 
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households and those households with infected or affected with HIV and AIDS (GOM, 
2008b). Although Dorward et al. (2010) note that the targeting criteria place explicit 
emphasis on vulnerable groups, in practice, there are difficulties in the application of 
these criteria, particularly due to the fact that the targeting criteria have remained wide 
and that the criteria fit large numbers of households against the available number of 
coupons allocated for the area.  
 
The agricultural subsidy programme mainly focuses on the subsidization of maize 
fertilizers and improved maize seeds. However, the scope of coverage of crops under the 
subsidy programme has varied over time. In addition to maize the coverage has included 
tobacco, tea and coffee fertilizers, legume seeds, cotton seeds and chemicals and maize 
storage chemicals (most notably in 2008/9). However the basic entitlements of a 
beneficiary household to either a maize package of fertilizers and seeds or a tobacco 
package of fertilizers or a cotton package of chemicals and seeds. Beneficiaries in 2008/9 
were also entitled to a flexible coupon to enable them purchase legume seeds, maize 
storage chemicals as well as improved maize seeds. In the 2008/09 season, due to 
substantial increases in the prices of fertilizers, the fertilizer subsidy also covered 
smallholder tea and coffee farmers. However, since the 2009/10 agricultural season, the 
FISP has excluded cash crops and concentrates on the subsidization of fertilizers for 
maize and on subsidization of improved maize seeds and legumes. 
 
2.1 Coupon Allocation Systems 
 
In the 2008/09 season, there were three stages in the targeting process: first updating a 
register of all farm households, second allocation of coupons to districts and within 
districts, and third local (village) processes of selection of beneficiaries. The registration 
of farmers first started in the 2007/08 season and this register was updated in the 
2008/09 season between May and August 2008. The register formed the basis of 
allocation of coupons to the districts and within the villages. The second stage, coupon 
allocation to districts and within districts, is based on maize areas cultivated and number 
of farm households. The third stage processes of identification of households have 
changed over time. Prior to the 2007/08 season, there was no registration of farm 
families: local leaders and village level development committees were responsible for 
identifying beneficiaries and, to a varying extent, agricultural staff managed the 
distribution of coupons. In the 2008/09 season, an open system of identification of 
beneficiaries (community-based targeting) using the farming households register was 
introduced (though not universally followed) in the allocation of coupons, with Ministry 
of Agriculture staff playing a leading role in open meetings for the disbursement of 
coupons. From 2007/8 there was also greater involvement of other stakeholders in the 
facilitation of these processes including religious leaders, VDC members, local 
government, police and civil society representatives as well as Ministry of Agriculture 
staff.  
 
Table 1 shows the extent to which open meetings were reported in coupon allocation 
and distribution in the 2008/09 agricultural season across regions. It is evident that the 
open meeting system was used widely in both the allocation and distribution of fertilizer 
subsidy coupons. About 81 percent and 96 percent respectively of the households in the 
sample confirmed that open meetings in allocation and distribution of fertilizer subsidy 
coupons were held in their communities. The processes were therefore more open than 
in the past, particularly the distribution of fertilizer coupons. Dorward et al. (2010) note 
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that due to the large number of eligible households relative to the number of coupons 
allocated to the villages, there was often an informal system of re-distribution of coupons 
within the villages after the open meeting, with about 43 percent of the sample reporting 
that re-distribution took place in the villages.  
 
Table 1 Extent of Use of Open Meeting in Allocation and Distribution of Fertilizer 
Subsidy 2008/09 
Region Allocation (% of sample) Distribution (% of sample) 
North 88 99 
Central 71 97 
South 88 95 
Total 81 96 
Source: Dorward et al. (2010) 
 
Targeting is one of the critical elements of the effectiveness of the subsidy and in 
achieving efficiency in resource use. In an economy where the private marketing system 
in input markets is functioning, it is important to ensure that the subsidy does not 
displace commercial sales of fertilizers. In other words, the subsidized fertilizers should 
be targeted at households that could not have bought fertilizers at the prevailing market 
prices. Hence, the efficiency of a targeted programme depends on the extent to which 
errors of inclusion and exclusion can be minimized in the selection of beneficiaries.  
 
According to Coady et al (2002) errors of inclusion (leakage) occur when the non-poor or 
unintended households are included in the programme while errors of exclusion (under 
coverage) occur when the poor or intended households are not included in the 
programme.2 The problems of targeting social programs are well-known in the literature 
due to lack of information, high cost of acquiring information and social stigma. The 
literature provides a number of alternative targeting methods in social programs 
including using individual/household assessments based on socio-economic data, 
categorical targeting, self-selection and community based targeting. These different 
methods have their own advantages and shortcomings in different contexts (Morley and 
Coady, 2003). Although more recently community based targeting is being advocated, as 
a participatory approach to identification of beneficiaries, as Morley and Coady (2003) 
note there is a danger of elite capture and variable interpretation of the programme 
beneficiary identification criteria. Dorward et al (2010) and Chinsinga (2009), in the 
context of the input subsidy programme, note that the criteria for beneficiary 
identification remains wide and subject to different interpretation and communities tend 
to emphasis on different vulnerable groups. Similarly, the 20-30 percent estimated 
displacement of commercial fertilizer in the 2006/07 programme also suggest that a 
substantial number of households that could afford fertilizers at prevailing market prices 
were erroneously included in the programme (SOAS et al, 2008).  
                                                     
2 These errors are also known as E-mistakes (excessive coverage) and F-mistakes (failure in prime 
objective), respectively (Cornia and Stewart, 1995). See Coady and Skoufias (2001) for alternative 
interpretations. 
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2.2 Gender and Targeting of Fertilizer Coupons 
 
The 2008/9 Agricultural Input Subsidy Survey (AISS2) sample comprises 26.8 percent 
female-headed and 73.2 percent male-headed households. About 68 percent of female-
headed households and 66 percent of male-headed households received subsidized 
fertilizer coupons. Figure 1 shows that female-headed recipient households got less 
subsidized fertilizers compared to male-headed recipient households, yet female-headed 
households have severe affordability problems as reflected in the lower average purchase 
of commercial fertilizers in 2008/09 season. On average, female-headed households 
acquired only 21 kilograms of commercial fertilizers compared to 64 kilograms acquired 
by male-headed households. Overall, male-headed households had 67 percent more 
fertilizers than female-headed households. These results support earlier findings that 
when female-headed households had access to coupons they tended to receive less than 
male-headed households (Dorward et al., 2010; SOAS et al, 2008, although reported 
differences declined from 206/7 to 2008/9). 
 
Figure 1 Subsidized and Commercial Fertilizer by Gender of Household Head 
 
 Source: Computed from AISS 2009 data 
 
 
2.3 Welfare and Targeting of Coupons 
 
Table 2 shows the characteristics of rural households by the number of coupons received 
for subsidized fertilizer. Although since 2006/7, targeting criteria have placed more 
explicit emphasis on the provision of coupons to more vulnerable households, the 
evidence point to the fact that the poor and vulnerable groups continue to be generally 
marginalized. The number of coupons received per household increases with land size, 
wealth (represented by value of assets and livestock), subjective welfare and food 
security. 
 
  
49.4
53.6
20.8
64.1
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
Female Male
Subsidy Fertilizer
Commercial Fertilizer
K
ilo
g
ra
m
s
Draft Version 2 5
Table 2 Mean Attributes of Households by Number of Fertilizer Subsidy Coupons 
Received, 2008/9 
  
Household Characteristics  
Fertiliser Coupon numbers per Household 
 
Zero 0.5 to 1 1.5 to 2 > 2 All 
Sig. 
% Female Headed Households 1.26 1.31 1.24 1.17 1.27 * 
Owned Area in Hectares 1.16 1.09 1.48 2.17 1.27 ** 
Value Durable Assets (MK) 19,621 15,630 20,340 28,111 18,702  
Value Livestock Assets (MK) 18,689 22,947 41,807 58,946 28,699 * 
Subjective Score of HH Food Consumption over 
past 12 months  
(1=inadequate, …., 3=more than adequate) 
1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.5 * 
Subjective Score on Welfare  
(1=very unsatisfied, …., 5=very satisfied) 
2.3 2.2 2.5 2.8 2.3 ** 
Month after Harvest that Maize ran out 7.2 7.1 7.9 8.6 7.4 * 
Notes:  *= one or more differences significant at p=0.05, ** = one or more differences significant at 0.01 
Source: Dorward et al. (2010) 
 
2.4 Age of Household Head and Targeting of Coupons 
 
Apart from female-headed households other vulnerable groups included in the targeting 
criteria are child headed, orphan headed households and those households with 
members infected or affected with HIV and AIDS. Since the survey draws the sample 
from the 2004/05 integrated household survey with random replacement of households 
in subsidy evaluation surveys, the data is biased against new and hence younger 
households (that may largely be in the youth group). Hence, the data has limitations to 
shed light on youths, child-headed households and households infected or affected with 
HIV and AIDS. Given these limitations, the analysis of access to subsidized fertilizers by 
age groups provides some indication of targeting to elderly-headed households and to 
less extent youth-headed households. Figure 2 provides the distribution of the sample 
(weighted) by age groups and, receipt of subsidized fertilizer coupons and gender 
distribution within age groups. The sample is dominated by household heads between 
the ages of 25 and 40 accounting for 39 percent, followed by 51-65 year olds accounting 
for 21 percent, with the youths (18 – 24 years) only accounting for 3 percent of the 
sample. Male-headed households also dominate in all the age groups with the exception 
of the elderly in which 55 percent of the households are male-headed. There are also 
differences in access to subsidized fertilizer coupons across the age groups with the 
lowest proportion of 66 percent among households in the 25-40 year age group and the 
highest proportion of 78 percent among households in the 51-64 year age group. Among 
the elderly group (65 years and above), 73 percent received subsidized fertilizer coupons. 
There is therefore no bias in favour of the elderly-headed household in targeting of 
subsidized fertilizers: this would not be expected if the targeting guidelines were 
followed, as vulnerable groups are expected to account for a higher proportion of those 
with access to subsidized fertilizers. 
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Figure 2 Receipt of Coupon, Household Headship and Sample by Age Groups 
 
Source: Computed from AISS 2009 data. 
 
There are also differences in the quantity of fertilizers acquired by households across the 
age groups (Figure 3). The average amounts of subsidised fertilizers acquired by 
households across the age groups do not substantially differ although the households 
headed by 51-64 year olds has the highest average access to subsidized fertilizers. 
However, there are substantial differences in the average amount of commercial 
fertilizers acquired by households, with the households headed by 41-50 year olds 
acquiring on average 72 kilograms compared with the 18-24 year olds who acquired 13 
kilograms from commercial purchase. The elderly acquired 23 kilograms. The low level 
of commercial purchase for the households headed by the youths and the elderly may 
indicate high affordability problems for this group – new households as new entrants into 
farming may have particular cash constraints. 
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Figure 3 Subsidized and Commercial Fertilizers by Age of Household Head 
 
Source: Computed from AISS 2009 data. 
 
 
As noted earlier, the difficulties in targeting vulnerable households arise from 
practicalities of applying the prescribed targeting criteria. Dorward et al. (2010) note that 
fundamental difficulties in targeting therefore arise because of ambiguities, tensions and 
contradictions among different targeting criteria, related to difficulties in clearly 
establishing measures for applying these criteria, both of these being related to large 
numbers of households apparently deserving of coupons relative to the number of 
coupons available. As a result there are many variations in the characteristics of 
beneficiaries of fertilizer subsidy coupons, and the better-off households tend to 
dominate the vulnerable households, and the vulnerable households tend to receive less. 
 
3.0 Factors Influencing Targeting of Beneficiaries 
 
It is important to determine the factors that affect access to fertilizer subsidy coupons or 
acquisition of subsidized fertilizers. This is pursued here through a regression analysis of 
the determinants of access to subsidized fertilizers using two definitions of access. The 
first definition of access is the receipt of fertilizer coupons, whether the household uses it 
or not to purchase subsidized fertilizers. SOAS et al. (2008) estimated a similar 
regression model; however, their model focuses on access to subsidized fertilizers – those 
households that actually used their coupon allocations to purchase fertilizers. The second 
definition incorporates use of the coupons and measures access in terms of the amount of 
subsidized fertilizers acquired by the household (SOAS et al., 2008). Annex Table 1 
present descriptive statistics of variables included in the models. 
 
The results from a regression model (see Annex Table 2) of access to subsidized fertilizer 
coupons confirm a number of observations made from the earlier discussion of simple 
descriptive statistics, and also reveal new insights:  
 
• The age of the household head matters, and older household heads are more 
likely to receive fertilizer coupons than younger household heads. Since residence 
in the village is one of the targeting criteria, older household heads may have 
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lived in the village longer than younger households, so this positive relationship is 
consistent with the targeting criteria. 
• Households that are headed by the elderly are unlikely to receive fertilizer 
coupons, suggesting exclusion errors. This is contrary to the emphasis on special 
vulnerable groups that has been placed recently in the targeting criteria for the 
subsidy programme. It may also be the case that elderly headed households are 
labour-constrained for farming activities and therefore use the coupons least in 
farming. 
• Households with larger parcels on land under cultivation are more likely to 
receive subsidized fertilizer coupons. The positive relationship is expected since 
land is one of the main criteria for targeting smallholder farmers.  
• Cultivation of tobacco, maize marketing and general produce marketing all 
increase the probability of receiving fertilizer coupons. This implies that fertilizer 
coupons are likely to go to those smallholder farmers that earn cash incomes from 
agriculture with the potential to purchase fertilizers at prevailing market prices. 
This would not seem to support current targeting objectives and criteria, and 
suggests existence of inclusion errors.  
• Households that bought commercial fertilizers in the previous season are less 
likely to be allocated subsidized fertilizer coupons, and purchase of commercial 
fertilizers marginally leads to reduction in the probability of accessing coupons. 
This suggests weak adherence to targeting that should reduce inclusion errors and 
ineffectiveness and inefficiency from subsidising farmers who would have bought 
commercial fertilizer without the subsidy.  
• Households that view themselves as poor are less likely to receive coupons. In the 
first two years of the subsidy, evidence of households having cash for coupon 
redemption was a pre-condition in some communities for households to receive 
fertilizer coupons (ICL et al., 2007 and SOAS et al., 2008). SOAS et al. (2008) 
find similar results on the effect of own poverty evaluation on the likelihood of 
receiving fertilizers, with wealthier households receiving disproportionately more 
coupons than poor households. 
• Participation in the labour market either through salaried or ganyu employment in 
the 2007/08 season reduced the household’s chances of receiving coupons in the 
2008/09 season. This implies that those in salaried employment are excluded as 
they are capable of purchasing fertilizers at commercial prices and those in ganyu 
employment maybe those households that do not have adequate land and use 
their labour resource in ganyu labour. Nonetheless, ganyu labour is also the 
second most important source of cash for redeeming the coupons (SOAS et al., 
2008 and Dorward et al., 2010).  
• Receipt of remittances in the previous season increases the probability of 
receiving coupons. Remittances are an important source of cash for redemption of 
coupons and for purchase of farm inputs in the rural areas.  
• Access to other social safety nets in the previous season is positively associated 
with receipt of fertilizer coupons in the 2008/09 season. This implies that 
participants in other social safety nets are not excluded from the fertilizer 
vouchers, and if these safety nets are well targeted then they can provide 
additional information about the vulnerable households in the communities.  
• Households that benefited from the subsidy in the previous season were more 
likely to receive the coupons in the next season. The probability of receiving 
fertilizer coupons increases by 45 percent for households targeted in the previous 
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season. The targeting impacts of this of course depend upon the criteria used in 
targeting the previous year and on criteria used in excluding precious beneficiaries 
and including new ones.  
• Open forums for allocating coupons increase the chance of targeting those that 
ranked themselves in the poor category. This suggests that community based 
targeting may be superior to allocations that involve traditional leaders and 
committees, as was previously the case in the 2005/06 up to the 2007/08 season. 
 
The second model examining the factors associated with the quantity of subsidized 
fertilizers acquired by the households in 2008/09 season (see Annex Table 3) revealed 
the following results, generally similar to those of the first model: 
 
• There is a positive relationship between quantity of subsidized fertilizers and land 
size, tobacco cultivation, maize marketing and general crop marketing. 
Cultivation of tobacco raises the amount of subsidized fertilizers by 28 kilograms. 
This implies that on average tobacco farmers received more fertilizers than non-
tobacco farmers. 
• There is no evidence of a significant relationship between subsidized fertilizers 
and commercial fertilizers; however the weak negative relationship suggests that 
the programme includes some households that can afford commercial fertilizers, 
leading to some displacement of commercial sales. 
• Households that rank themselves in the poor category are likely to receive about 
15 kilograms less than households in the non-poor category. As with coupons, 
there is a tendency for the subsidized fertilizers to reach the better off farmers. 
• Households that are food secure tend to receive 7 kilograms more subsidized 
fertilizers than food insecure households, perhaps suggesting inclusion errors. 
• As with the first model, participation in the labour market is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
• Access to subsidized fertilizer in the previous season increases the amount of 
subsidized fertilizer in the 2008/09 season. Households that are successively 
receiving subsidized fertilizers receive 56 kilograms (just more than a 50 kg bag) 
more that households that only received fertilizers in the 2008/09 season.  
• Transparency in coupon allocation also tends to favour the poor with the 
coefficient of the interaction of open forum and poverty being positive.  
 
4.0 Conclusions 
 
The paper set out to investigate factors that facilitate access to subsidized fertilizer 
coupons in Malawi. The agricultural input subsidy programme targets smallholder 
farmers who are resource-poor but own a piece of land. The targeting criteria also 
recognizes special vulnerable groups as targets such as guardians looking after physically 
challenged persons, child-headed, female-headed and orphan-headed households and 
households infected or affected with HIV and AIDS. There are some contradictions in 
the targeting criteria in reaching out to vulnerable groups. Nonetheless, the targeting 
criteria remain wide and there are variations in the use of the targeting guidelines in 
different communities, particularly since the number of needy households tends to be 
much larger than the available number of fertilizer coupons. The following conclusions 
emerge: 
 
Draft Version 2 10
• Although the poor and vulnerable households are also allocated subsidized 
fertilizer coupons, they are less likely and receive less than the better off 
smallholder farmers that have larger parcels of land and wealthier. Elderly-
headed households and the poor are less likely to access subsidized fertilizer 
coupons while households with larger parcels of land and those that market part 
of their produce are more likely to receive subsidized fertilizer coupons.  
• The programme, however, succeeds in excluding households that earn incomes 
from the labour market, particularly those that earn income from non-ganyu 
labour. There is a weak relationship between access to coupons and quantity of 
fertilizers from commercial purchases, implying that the inclusion errors of 
targeting result in some displacement of commercial sales of fertilizers. 
• Participation in other social safety nets in the past does not exclude households 
from the input subsidy programme. The beneficiaries of other social safety nets 
are more likely to access subsidized fertilizer coupons, hence demonstrating some 
complementarities among social safety nets. Some of the social safety nets that 
target the poor and vulnerable households, such as cash for work or public works 
programs ease the cash constraint of vulnerable households and enable them to 
redeem the fertilizer coupons. In addition, if other social safety nets are well 
targeted at the vulnerable groups, it implies that participation in such programmes 
provide additional information on vulnerability in targeting the input subsidy 
programme.  
• Openness in the implementation of the input subsidy programme is pro-poor. The 
introduction of the open forums in the allocation of subsidized fertilizer coupons 
tends to raise the likelihood of the poor, who are generally marginalized, to 
access subsidized fertilizer coupons and to acquire more subsidized fertilizers 
than when the process is not transparent. 
 
The results therefore suggest that for the subsidy programme to effectively target resource 
poor farmers there is need to review the targeting criteria so that they recognize the 
vulnerable groups as the main target group, provided such households have cultivatable 
land. For instance, using a point system on the existing criteria has the potential to 
increase access to subsidized fertilizers to the vulnerable groups. While possession of 
land should be the basic condition for access to fertilizer coupons, households should 
gain additional targeting points if they also qualify as vulnerable households as defined 
by the existing criteria. For instance, an elderly female-headed household would get two 
additional targeting points while an elderly male-headed household would only get one 
additional targeting point. Households with land and high targeting points should be 
prioritized in the allocation of coupons using an open forum held in the community. 
Such a points system might also promote transparency and accountability in the 
identification of beneficiaries and distribution of coupons.  
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Annex Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean SD Min Max 
Access to fertilizer coupons in 2008/9 (0/1) 
Quantity of subsidized fertilizers acquired 2008/9 (KG) 
Age of household head (years) 
Male headed household (0/1) 
Elderly headed household (0/1) 
Household size (adult equivalents) 
Value of assets in US dollars in 2008/9 
Cultivated land in hectares in 2008/9 
Tobacco cultivation in 2008/9 (0/1) 
Crop marketing in 2008/9 (0/1) 
Maize marketing in 2008/9 (0/1) 
Quantity of commercial fertilizers bought in 2007/8 (KG) 
Own poverty assessment as poor in 2007/8 (0/1) 
Adequate food consumption in 2008/9 (0/1) 
Business enterprise in 2007/8 (0/1) 
Labour market participation  in 2007/8  (0/1) 
Remittance receipts in 2007/8 
Access to social safety nets in 2007/8 (0/1) 
Access to fertilizer coupons in 2007/8 (0/1) 
Open forum allocations 2008/9 and poor 2007/8 (0/1) 
Northern region (0/1) 
Central region (0/1) 
Southern region (0/1) 
0.699 
53.589 
47.133 
0.736 
0.155 
4.714 
165.22 
0.978 
0.156 
0.330 
0.101 
43.02 
0.865 
0.462 
0.395 
0.497 
0.392 
0.147 
0.593 
0.709 
0.192 
0.363 
0.446 
0.459 
49.910 
16.063 
0.441 
0.362 
2.109 
632.76 
0.722 
0.363 
0.471 
0.302 
230.43 
0.342 
0.499 
0.489 
0.500 
0.488 
0.354 
0.491 
0.454 
0.394 
0.481 
0.497 
0.00 
0.00 
18.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.00 
600.0 
99.00 
1.00 
1.00 
16.98 
18064 
6.88 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
6700 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
Notes: (0/1) indicates dichotomous variable equal to 1 for the included category, otherwise equal to 0 for 
the base category. 
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Annex Table 2 Probit Estimates for Access to Fertilizer Coupons in 2008/09 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
dF/dx z dF/dx z 
Age of household head (years) 
Male headed household (0/1)* 
Elderly headed household (0/1)* 
Household size (adult equivalents) 
Value of assets in US dollars in 2008/9 
Cultivated land in hectares in 2008/9 
Tobacco cultivation in 2008/9 (0/1)* 
Maize marketing in 2008/9 (0/1)* 
Crop marketing in 2008/9 (0/1)* 
Quantity of commercial fertilizers bought in 2007/8 (KG) 
Own poverty assessment as poor in 2007/8 (0/1)* 
Adequate food consumption in 2008/9 (0/1)* 
Business enterprise in 2007/8 (0/1)* 
Labour market participation  in 2007/8  (0/1)* 
Remittance receipts in 2007/8 (0/1)* 
Access to social safety nets in 2007/8 (0/1)* 
Access to fertilizer coupons in 2007/8 (0/1)* 
Open forum allocations 2008/9 and poor 2007/8 (0/1)* 
Central region (0/1)* 
Southern region (0/1)* 
0.0032 
0.0021 
-0.1304 
-0.0113 
0.00001 
0.0561 
0.1720 
0.1126 
- 
-0.0002 
-0.0802 
0.0202 
0.0051 
-0.0411 
0.0747 
0.0704 
0.4460 
0.0981 
-0.0367 
-0.0321 
3.11a 
0.08 
-2.75a 
-2.02b 
-0.67 
3.03a 
5.29a 
3.22a 
- 
-2.50b 
-2.19b 
0.91 
0.23 
-1.83c 
3.26a 
2.36b 
20.21a 
3.39a 
-1.11 
-0.99 
0.0027 
-0.0032 
-0.1226 
-0.0075 
0.00001 
0.0624 
- 
- 
0.1011 
-0.0001 
-0.0706 
0.0221 
0.0006 
-0.0490 
0.0741 
0.0792 
0.4515 
0.0854 
-0.0520 
-0.0432 
2.54b 
-0.13 
-2.44b 
-0.89 
-0.88 
3.36a 
- 
- 
4.27a 
-2.39b 
-1.88c 
0.99 
0.03 
-2.17b 
3.23a 
2.67a 
20.46a 
2.92a 
-1.55 
-1.35 
Number of observations 
Wald chi-squared (18) 
Prob > chi-squared 
Pseudo R-squared 
1982 
517.51 
0.000 
0.2703 
 1982 
518.39 
0.000 
0.2582 
 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy variable for access to subsidized fertilizer coupons received in 
the 2008/09 agricultural season. (*) dF/dx (marginal effect) is for discrete change of dummy 
variable from 0 to 1. Robust t-statistics with superscripts a, b and c denotes significance at the 1, 5 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Annex Table 3 Tobit Estimates for Access to Subsidized Fertilizers in 2008/09 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
coeff. z coeff. z 
Age of household head (years) 
Male headed household (0/1) 
Elderly headed household (0/1) 
Household size (adult equivalents) 
Value of assets in US dollars in 2008/9 
Cultivated land in hectares in 2008/9 
Tobacco cultivation in 2008/9 (0/1) 
Maize marketing in 2008/9 (0/1) 
Crop marketing in 2008/9 (0/1) 
Quantity of commercial fertilizers bought in 2007/8 (KG) 
Own poverty assessment as poor in 2007/8 (0/1) 
Adequate food consumption in 2008/9 (0/1) 
Business enterprise in 2007/8 (0/1) 
Labour market participation  in 2007/8  (0/1) 
Remittance receipts in 2007/8 
Access to social safety nets in 2007/8 (0/1) 
Access to fertilizer coupons in 2007/8 (0/1) 
Open forum allocations 2008/9 and poor 2007/8 (0/1) 
Central region (0/1) 
Southern region (0/1) 
Constant 
0.227 
1.698 
-7.940 
-1.172 
-0.004 
12.947 
27.639 
15.934 
- 
-0.014 
-15.299 
6.501 
0.432 
-8.217 
5.049 
4.666 
56.109 
13.167 
-24.973 
-18.023 
3.257 
1.69c 
0.49 
-1.49 
-1.62 
-1.09 
4.75a 
7.21a 
3.32a 
- 
-1.28 
-2.62a 
2.23b 
0.15 
-2.85a 
1.63 
1.40 
15.82a 
3.36a 
-6.35a 
-4.51a 
0.35 
0.118 
0.921 
-4.926 
0.165 
-0.004 
13.679 
- 
- 
17.277 
-0.010 
-13.819 
6.179 
-0.389 
-9.297 
4.486 
5.906 
57.306 
11.489 
-28.354 
-20.761 
4.675 
0.84 
0.26 
-0.85 
0.16 
-1.29 
5.15a 
- 
- 
5.45a 
-1.00 
-2.37b 
2.10b 
-0.13 
-3.20a 
1.44 
1.79c 
16.19a 
2.89a 
-6.97a 
-5.20a 
0.50 
Number of observations 
F (18, 1963) 
Prob > F 
Pseudo R-squared 
1982 
27 
0.000 
0.0406 
 1982 
26.3 
0.000 
0.0388 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is quantity of subsidized fertilizer acquired in the 2008/09 agricultural 
season. Robust t-statistics with superscripts a, b and c denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. 
